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ABSTRACT: This paper reads Foucault’s 1975-6 lecture series Society Must Be Defended. It ar-
gues that the notion of counter-history developed in these lectures depends on a particular 
construction of Rome, as that which counter-history counters. Foucault’s version of Rome in 
turn depends on a surprisingly conventional reading of two monumental histories (Livy’s Ab 
Urbe Condita and Virgil’s Aeneid) as ‘the praise of Rome’. Reading Foucault’s work instead 
with Lucan’s Pharsalia renders visible a counter-history within Rome itself. This reading 
demonstrates the ways in which reception theory can usefully illuminate and supplement 
Foucauldian genealogy as a critical-historical method. 
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Is there anything more to history than the praise of Rome? 
- Petrarch, cited by Foucault1 
 
Introduction  
In the Introduction to this special issue, Richard Alston writes that “Foucault establishes Rome as 
a point of critical perspective. But this perspective also enables historians of Rome to ‘speak back’ 
to Foucault and to use the history of Rome to reassess, reflect upon, develop, criticise, and ad-
vance the dialogue.”2 
I am not a historian of Rome, but a reception scholar. My work seeks to account for the 
ways in which literary texts and historical phenomena are received, read and rewritten, by read-
ers, often across great temporal distances – and, in particular, to account for the persistence of (a 
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76, translated by David Macey 
(New York: Picador, 2003), 74. 
2 Richard Alston, “Foucault’s Rome,” Foucault Studies, see above.  
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certain version of) Rome in the European imaginary. In this paper, accordingly, I am using the 
reception of Roman history, rather than the history of Rome as such, to reassess and advance the 
dialogue between Foucault and the Classics. I am interested in the ways in which Foucault mod-
els time and history, and especially in the moments where his models seem to depend upon a 
particular construction of Rome.  
In this paper, then, I seek to open a dialogue between Foucault’s Rome and the Rome of a 
Classical reception scholar – a dialogue, that is, between genealogy and reception. I do so by read-
ing Foucault’s 1975-6 lecture series at the Collège de France, published in English as Society Must 
Be Defended. Typically for his work in the mid-seventies, the Society lectures focus on the late six-
teenth to the late eighteenth century. They trace the emergence, in this period, of a historical dis-
course of permanent war – one which Foucault repeatedly and remarkably calls an “anti-Roman” 
counter-history. What does it mean to say that an early modern discourse is still doing battle with 
the long-fallen Roman Empire? What model of temporality underlies Foucault’s formulation of 
the seventeenth-century counter-history, and why must it be Rome that underpins this model? 
What historical or theoretical work is Rome doing for Foucault, and how does it do so?  
I explore these questions in two ways. Firstly, by reading a Roman epic poem (Lucan’s De 
Bello Ciuili; not one of the texts drawn on by Foucault) which conforms closely to the characteris-
tics of the discourse that Foucault analyses in the lectures, thus enabling Rome to “speak back” to 
Foucault. Secondly, by analysing, in Foucault’s terms as well as in the terms of Classical reception 
theory, what this phenomenon of “resemblance or repetition” means: what theory of history, re-
ception, or genealogy can account for the relationship between Rome and the present day, and for 
the importance of Rome to Foucault’s own position here?  
 
Permanent war and counter-history 
Foucault’s aim in the lectures which comprise Society Must Be Defended is to analyse the emer-
gence of a “new discourse, a strange discourse… the first historico-political discourse on socie-
ty.”3 He identifies two historical moments of emergence for this discourse: the first in England in 
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, and the second in France a century later in the 
work of Boulainvilliers and a small group of noble historians who are trying to shore up the pow-
er of the aristocracy against the growing power of the bureaucracy.  
The emergent discourse that Foucault analyses is strange and new because it supplies an 
alternative to theories of sovereignty and contract as the basis of civil society, proceeding instead 
from the principle that “politics is the continuation of war by other means.”4 According to this 
discourse, “war… was understood to be a permanent social relationship, the ineradicable basis of 
                                                 
3 Foucault, Society, 49. 
4 Ibid., 48. 
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all relations and institutions of power.”5 War is no longer something that can be terminated by 
peace. Foucault writes:  
 
Society, the law, and the State are [not] like armistices that put an end to wars, or… the prod-
ucts of definitive victories. Law is not pacification, for beneath the law, war continues to rage in 
all the mechanisms of power, even in the most regular. War is the motor behind institutions and 
order.6 
 
The institutions of peaceful society do not end war; rather, the permanent unstable play of domi-
nation and repression is transferred into, and occluded by, the institutions of peace, which be-
come the means by which the strong continue their war against the weak. 
Among these institutions are the institutions of knowledge, and Foucault argues that 
“[t]his discourse established a basic link between relations of force and relations of truth:” indeed, 
“it is a discourse in which truth functions exclusively as a weapon that is used to win an exclu-
sively partisan victory.”7 Truth, far from being the product of a peaceful, serene, and neutral 
standpoint somehow outside or above the play of domination and repression, “can be deployed 
only from its combat position;”8 truth is strategically produced and directed by a subject who is 
irrevocably committed to one side or another in this war.  
This truth, which is a weapon in an endless war, is above all historical truth. As we have 
seen, it is in the articulation of history with politics that Foucault identifies the newness and 
strangeness of the discourse of permanent war, as well as its significance: “it is, I think, important 
because it is the first discourse in postmedieval Western society that can be strictly defined as be-
ing historico-political.”9 He goes on to write that “[i]t is a discourse that develops completely with-
in the historical dimension. It is deployed within a history that has no boundaries, no end, and no 
limits” (emphasis added).10 History, then, is the limitless field in which this discourse on war – 
which is also, itself, a war – emerges and is fought. This is where the political significance of the 
discourse is to be found: in its status as counter-history, which is also to say, in its transformation 
of history and historical knowledge into a – or even the – central site of political struggle, power, 
contestation, and resistance.  
It seems clear that Foucault’s interest in this seventeenth-century discourse is motivated by 
its political possibilities in the present. The discourse of permanent war offers a way of rethinking 
the history of sovereignty and the relationship between power and knowledge – but also, and 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 49. 
6 Ibid., 50. 
7 Ibid., 52, 58. 
8 Ibid., 52. 
9 Ibid., 51-52. 
10 Ibid., 55. 
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perhaps even more importantly, it frames Foucault’s own activity as a (counter-)historian as a 
significant act of resistance to power.  
This makes it all the more surprising that when we ask what this seventeenth-century 
counter-history is counter to, we find that the answer is: Rome. “What is specific about the new 
form of discourse that appeared… in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries,” Foucault 
writes, is that “this is the first non-Roman or anti-Roman history that the West had ever known;”11 
this is “not exactly the invention of historical discourse, but rather the shattering of a pre-existing 
historical discourse whose function had until then been to sing the praises of Rome.”12  
 
Roman history 
If this new discourse is an anti-Roman counter-history, what, then, characterizes the Roman histo-
ry that it counters? Roman history, for Foucault, is a name for the history of sovereignty: “the his-
tory of power as told by power itself, or the history of power that power had made people tell.”13 
This form of history “sings the praises of Rome” by glorifying power (it is “the great and glorious 
genealogy in which the law and power flaunt themselves in their power and their glory”), and, 
importantly for Foucault, it constructs history as both unity (“the unity of the city,” “the unity of 
the sovereign law”) and continuity (“the continuity of glory,” “a history of continuity”).14  
“Rome” thus functions here for Foucault, as it has for many other thinkers, as a dense and 
compact figure for the mutually defining intersection of history, power, and knowledge.15 As we 
will see in more detail later, Foucault does not care to date, or to analyse, the emergence of the 
discourse of Roman history itself: instead, for him it functions as an indistinct historical back-
ground against which new discourses differentiate themselves as they emerge. For a Classicist, 
however, the discourse of Roman history as a continuous narrative of Rome’s unity and sover-
eignty itself ultimately derives from aspects of the Roman Empire’s own self-presentation, and 
has a distinct date of emergence in the Augustan period (the late first century BCE/early first cen-
tury CE). The model of Roman history that Foucault invokes here can thus be traced back, above 
all, to two great monumental histories from the Augustan period, Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita (From the 
Foundation of the City) and Virgil’s Aeneid.  
                                                 
11 Ibid., 69; see also 71-72, “The historical discourse that appears at this point can therefore be regarded as a 
counter-history that challenges Roman history.”  
12 Ibid., 141. Foucault is referring to a question asked by Petrarch in the fourteenth century which he has cited 
earlier (74): “is there nothing more to history than the praise of Rome?” 
13 Ibid., 133. 
14 Ibid., 70-72.  
15 On Rome, power, and knowledge, see Ika Willis, “The Empire Never Ended,” in Classics in Post-Colonial 
Worlds, edited by Lorna Hardwick and Carol Gillespie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 329-348 
(https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296101.003.0019).  
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Livy, whose “enormous year-by-year annalistic history of Rome ‘from the foundation of 
the city’… emplots the foundation of Rome under the shadow of its present greatness,”16 is the 
only Roman author named in the lectures,17 but Foucault’s reference to this mode of history being 
“a ‘Jupiterian’ history”18 also summons up Virgil’s Aeneid. Although Foucault never names the 
Aeneid in the lectures, he does refer to the circulation of works in the medieval and Renaissance 
period which, in tracing the origin of the French people back to emigrant Trojan princes, bor-
rowed the Aeneid’s mythico-historical story-world and imitated its structure in order to produce 
analogous legitimating myths for European states.19 To some extent, then, the historical narrative 
that Foucault presents in these lectures is bound up with the reception of the Aeneid – the mecha-
nisms by which the Aeneid’s construction of history was able to filter through into medieval and 
post-medieval European thought. 
The Aeneid itself was the final work of the Augustan poet Virgil, composed between 29 
BCE and 19 BCE and published, unfinished, on his death (the narrative of the poem is complete 
but half-lines remain throughout). Both the context and the content of the poem position it as a 
monument to monumental history: an unambiguous history of sovereignty, explicitly singing the 
praises of Rome and telling the history of power from the point of view of power. In terms of the 
context, Virgil was one of a small circle of poets under the patronage of the emperor Augustus: as 
R. O. A. M. Lyne writes, “Augustus and the state were effectively synonymous. To be under his 
patronage, directly or indirectly, was to be in the patronage of government.”20 The poem can 
therefore be seen as speaking for, and from the position of, sovereign power. As for the content, 
the first book of the epic contains a prophecy tracing the continuous descent of sovereignty from 
Aeneas through his heirs to Romulus and ultimately to Julius Caesar (who claimed descent from 
                                                 
16 Duncan F. Kennedy, Antiquity and the Meanings of Time: A Philosophy of Ancient and Modern Literature (London 
and New York: I B Tauris, 2013), 97. 
17 Foucault, Society, 68, 71. On each occasion Foucault links Livy with the “early annalists” (68), “the annalist 
who records, day by day, the history and the uninterrupted glory of power,” (71) although – as even Kennedy’s 
brief summary (above) suggests – Livy is by no means keeping a day-by-day record of the doings of power but 
rather employing the annalistic form to emplot a deterministic and teleological narrative of the history of Rome 
from the perspective of his present.  
18 Foucault, Society, 68. 
19 Ibid., 115-117. The key work alluded to is Grégoire de Tours, Historia Francorum (575-592); the story of Francus 
would have been familiar to Foucault’s audience from Ronsard’s canonical epic poem La Franciade (1572). 
20 R. O. A. M. Lyne, “Augustan Poetry and Society,” in The Oxford History of the Ancient World, Volume 2: The Ro-
man World, edited by John Boardman, Jasper Griffin and Oswyn Murray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1988), 182-205, 186. Lyne gives the view which was consensus at around the time Foucault gave the Society lec-
tures; for a more nuanced view of Virgil’s relationship with Augustus, see R. J. Tarrant, “Poetry and power: Vir-
gil’s poetry in contemporary context,” in The Cambridge Companion to Virgil, edited by Charles Martindale (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 169-187, arguing that “the depiction of Virgil as a ‘client’ of Maece-
nas or Augustus himself, and therefore as saying only what accorded with their wishes and interests, employs a 
model of patron-client relations too simplistic for his situation” (183). 
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Aeneas’s son Iulus) and Augustus. The prophecy also foretells a moment when all war will cease, 
replaced by the lawful institutions of peaceful society. It is spoken by the king of the gods, Jupiter, 
himself:  
 
There will be born of this splendid lineage a Caesar, a Trojan. 
He’ll make Ocean the bounds of his power, and the stars of his glory, 
He will be Julius – a name that derives from the mighty Iulus… 
Then all wars will cease. These Ages of Harshness will soften.  
Vesta and white-haired Trust, Quirinus, along with his brother 
Remus, will make laws together.21 
 
History doesn’t come more “Jupiterian” than this.22 As this passage indicates, the Aeneid brings 
together all the characteristics that Foucault lists as being the marks of Roman/sovereign history: 
the praises of Rome; the concern with sovereignty and power; the representation of peace and the 
institutions of civil society as bringing an end to war; and the depiction of unity and continuity.23 
Foucault’s version of Roman history is, then, recognizable to a reception scholar not so 
much as the “truth” of Roman history, but as an instance of the remarkable persistence of a dis-
course of Roman history which can be traced back to Virgil’s Aeneid. Perhaps more surprisingly, 
however, Foucault’s version of the counter-historical discourse of permanent war – the “first non-
Roman or anti-Roman history that the West had ever known,”24 whose “date of birth” Foucault 
places “after the end of the civil and religious wars of the sixteenth century”25 – can also be recog-
nized, feature by feature, in a Latin epic poem from the Julio-Claudian period: Lucan’s De Bello 
Ciuili (On the Civil War, also known as the Bellum Ciuile [The Civil War] and the Pharsalia).26 Fou-
cault’s analysis of this counter-historical discourse can help us to read Lucan – but perhaps more 
                                                 
21 Virgil, Aeneid 1.286-93, translated by Frederick Ahl (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
22 The real story of the Aeneid is of course more complex and manifold, and “pessimistic” readings which see it 
as critiquing or deconstructing the workings of sovereignty rather than simply celebrating it have been elaborat-
ed at least since the early modern period, as Craig Kallendorf has argued (The Other Virgil: “Pessimistic” Readings 
of the Aeneid in Early Modern Culture [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007]). Again, here I am referring to the 
consensus view of the poem – one which I believe Foucault is drawing on, obliquely but significantly, to under-
pin his argument in these lectures. As Tarrant (“Poetry and Power,” 184) points out, this reading of the Aeneid is 
in part constructed and canonized by the great anti-Virgilian writers – including Lucan, who I’ll get to in a mi-
nute – as a foil to their own “counter-historical” projects.  
23 Foucault, Society, 70-72. For more on the construction of continuity in Virgil’s Aeneid and its deconstruction by 
Lucan, see Ika Willis, Now and Rome: Lucan and Vergil as Theorists of Politics and Space (London: Continuum, 2011).  
24 Foucault, Society, 69.  
25 Ibid., 49. 
26 For a brief overview of the problem of the title of Lucan’s epic see Susanna Morton Braund, A Lucan Reader: 
Selections from Civil War (Mundelein, Illinois: Bolchazy-Carducci, 2009), x. 
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importantly, the very existence of Lucan’s poem poses some important questions for Foucault’s 
model of Rome and history. 
The cultural influence of the Aeneid is so massive and pervasive in Europe that Foucault 
was certainly aware of the model of Roman history it represented, whether or not he was at that 
point offering a reading of Virgil’s text. By contrast, at the time when he was giving the Society 
lectures, Lucan’s epic was just beginning to emerge from a lengthy period of critical neglect.27 Un-
like more canonical Latin authors – say, Livy or Lucretius (both read in some detail by Foucault’s 
contemporary Michel Serres) – Lucan has not been used much as a critical resource by non-
classicists: his non-canonical status, however, is in part precisely because his wild, strange, and 
terrifying poem is not easily assimilated to our notions of what Rome, and Roman history, are.  
On the Civil War was composed between 61-65CE by the poet Lucan, a contemporary and 
friend of the emperor Nero. It is an epic poem in the same genre and metre as the Aeneid, but it 
gives a very different version of Roman history. It tells the story of the Roman civil wars in the 
period 60-47 BCE, with Pompey and Cato fighting against Julius Caesar. Caesar, the eventual vic-
tor and the man lauded in the Aeneid as the divinely-appointed – and divinely-descended – 
bringer of order, power, and glory to Rome, is the poem’s chief antagonist.  
The poem articulates a vision of a bleak, violent, disordered universe in a state of perma-
nent war, where history is written by the violent criminals who have won power through victory 
in the civil war and whose exercise of sovereignty is therefore itself an illegal act and a continua-
tion of civil war by other means. John Henderson’s essay “Lucan/The Word at War” offers a viv-
id description of the poem’s unmasking of the violence that underlies Roman (and Western) 
“civilisation,” writing that for Lucan:  
 
Civilisation is to be seen in teleogenic retrospect as an orgiastic calendar of self-mutilation built 
on the self-falsifying logic of war… War is laid bare in its scandal, and all the lies you have 
                                                 
27 The revitalization of critical attention to Lucan is usually dated to the publication in 1976 – the very year in 
which Foucault gave the lecture series I read in this paper – of Frederick Ahl’s Lucan: An Introduction (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1976). For a brief account of the fascinating, strange, and troubled twentieth-
century reception history of Lucan in English, see Robert Crowe, “Democratising the Classics: Penguin Books’ 
reception of classical literature,” PhD diss., University of Bristol, 2012. The pre-Ahl consensus view of Lucan can 
be seen in the introduction to the 1928 Loeb translation by J. D. Duff: “No reasonable judgment can rank Lucan 
among the world’s great epic poets… The truth is, that Lucan is not a poet in the sense in which Lucretius and 
Virgil are poets; he is read, not for any poetical quality but for his rhetorical invective and his pungent epi-
grams.” (Lucan, The Civil War, translated by J. D. Duff [Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 
1928]) Prior to the nineteenth century, however, Lucan had often been valued very highly: Dante, for example, 
has him as one of the four great classical poets he encounters in Limbo, the zone of the virtuous pagans, and, as 
we will see later in this paper, he was enormously popular in England in the late sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies. 
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made for yourselves fail… War is… a figuring and disfiguring of civilisation as an absurd pro-
cess of unmaking.28 
 
Lucan’s poem represents war as a permanent and universal state, only ever occluded by the lies 
of civil society. It performs a critique of sovereignty, unity, history and power which corresponds 
exactly to the key aspects of the discourse that Foucault analyses in the Society lectures. In the first 
section of this paper I sketched out the way Foucault’s lectures set out four key aspects of the sev-
enteenth-century discourse of permanent war: now I return to them to show how they are articu-
lated in Lucan’s epic.  
Firstly, politics as the continuation of war by other means. Lucan ends the very first book 
of the De Bello Ciuili with a series of prophecies, structurally positioned as responses to the proph-
ecy of Jupiter in the first book of the Aeneid, which I cited above. The longest, the prophecy of 
Figulus, contains the lines:  
 
The madness of war is upon us, when the power of the sword shall violently upset all legality, 
and atrocious crime shall be called heroism [literally, “the name for ‘unspeakable crime’ will be 
‘virtue’”]. This frenzy will last for many years; and it is useless to pray Heaven that it may end: 
when peace comes, a tyrant will come with it. Let Rome prolong the unbroken series of suffer-
ing and draw out her agony for ages: only while civil war lasts, shall she henceforth be free.29 
 
Where Virgil uses Jupiter’s prophecy to position Julius Caesar and Augustus as the unambiguous 
bringers of peace and order and the terminators of war, Lucan uses Figulus’ to argue that peace is 
not an end to war (“it is useless to pray that it may end”) but only another form of violent domi-
nation: the word translated as “tyrant” above is the Latin dominus or “master,” meaning a slave-
owner, a man who has the right to inflict corporal punishment on his slaves (exemption from cor-
poral punishment was a key mark of free status in Rome). Earlier in the first book, Lucan has also 
been at pains to point out that Nero’s authority derives not from any form of social contract be-
tween the ruler and the ruled, but from Caesar’s victory in civil war:  
 
Still, if Fate could find no other way for the advent of Nero; if an everlasting kingdom costs the 
gods dear… then we complain no more against the gods: even such crimes and such guilt are 
not too high a price to pay. Let Pharsalia heap her awful plains with dead; let the shade of the 
Carthaginian [i.e., Hannibal] be glutted with carnage; let the last battle be joined at fatal Munda; 
and though to these be added the famine of Perusia and the horrors of Mutina, the ships over-
whelmed near stormy Leucas and the war against slaves hard by the flames of Etna, yet Rome 
owes much to civil war, because what was done was done for you, Caesar.30  
 
                                                 
28 John Henderson, “Lucan/The Word at War,” Ramus 16 (1987),122-164,124.  
29 Lucan, DBC, 1.666-72., trans. Duff. 
30 Ibid., 1.33-45. I go through my reading of this passage in more detail in Now and Rome, 113-115. 
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The tone of this complex passage is hard to read and much-debated. Whether it is sincere or iron-
ic, however, the passage links sovereignty and civil war in two ways. Firstly, it exposes the source 
of Imperial power as conquest and domination – here figured explicitly through a list of violent 
atrocities committed against Roman citizens – rather than any social contract. This conforms to 
the model of right which Foucault argues Boulainvilliers developed in his history of Gaul after 
the Roman invasion: “This right was the right of the conquest… The right that prevailed there 
was in no sense a consensual sovereignty; it was the result of domination.”31 Secondly, the pas-
sage begins by contrasting Nero (good) to civil war (bad) – civil war was the terrible price we had 
to pay for this great leader – but ends with an address to “Caesar.” The context makes clear that 
the referent for this name is Nero, but the choice of word is deliberately ambiguous: far from be-
ing external to the civil war, the thing that is exchanged for it, Nero is indistinguishable from one 
of the participants in it. Lucan’s use of the word “Caesar,” naming both the violent criminal who 
attacked the Roman State (in book 1 of the De Bello Ciuili, at the moment when he is about to cross 
of the Rubicon, Caesar sees a vision of Rome as a woman begging him to stop) and the glorious 
leader of the divinely-sanctioned Roman Empire, exposes the continuity – even the identity – be-
tween these figures: the invader and the sovereign.  
Politics, then, is the continuation of war by other means, and that war is permanent – the 
second characteristic of the discourse that Foucault analyses in the Society lectures. “War,” Fou-
cault writes, “was understood to be a permanent social relationship, the ineradicable basis of all 
relations and institutions of power... War is the motor behind institutions and order.”32 As we 
have already seen, Lucan exposes the civil war as the basis of Rome’s institutions of power; even 
more strikingly, however, he materializes Foucault’s image of war as the “motor” of order. He 
does this in an extraordinary simile near the start of Book 1, where he compares the fall of Rome 
to the end of the world, writing:  
 
Even so, when the framework of the world is dissolved and the final hour, closing so many ag-
es, reverts to primeval chaos, then… the whole distracted fabric [discors machina] of the shat-
tered firmament will overthrow its laws.33  
 
W. R. Johnson draws attention to the “superb oxymoron” discors machina, which he calls “beauti-
ful… and frightening.”34 This is the phrase translated here as “distracted fabric,” which literally 
means something like “unharmonious apparatus” and could be translated as “civil-war-machine” 
or “motor of disorder.”35 The word machina, which means “machine” or “engine,” appears only 
                                                 
31 Foucault, Society, 145.  
32 Ibid., 49. 
33 Lucan, DBC, 1.72-80, trans. Duff. 
34 W. R. Johnson, Momentary Monsters: Lucan and his Heroes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 16. 
35 The recent Penguin translation has “contraption” for machina, giving something of the sense of a rickety, non-
self-identical apparatus, but recasts the sentence so that discors is no longer an adjective characterizing machina 
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four times in the De Bello Ciuili: in all its other three appearances (6.37, 8.377, 10.481) it is part of 
the phrase machina belli, explicitly referring to a war-engine such as a battering ram. The word 
discors is frequently used for civil war both in Lucan and in other Roman authors. The image of 
the discors machina suggests both that the entire machinery of the universe is designed to produce 
civil war (discors machina, civil-war-machine, an apparatus for making discord) and that the motor 
of the universe itself is in a state of discordia: originarily divided against itself and at war. War is 
not a disruption of order, or something that can be ended by peace and the institution of order: 
rather, order is an illusion, and the (dis)ordered universe that we inhabit is powered by a war-
machine.  
This war, the war that powers the universe, is fought in the domain of knowledge and 
truth: the De Bello Ciuili, as much as the discourse that Foucault analyses in the Society lectures, 
can be said to “establi[sh] a basic link between relations of force and relations of truth,”36 and this 
is the third point of similarity between the two discourses. We have already seen a glimpse of this 
in Figulus’ assertion that war disrupts naming; war is a war over what things should be called 
(“the name for ‘unspeakable crime’ will be ‘virtue,’” 1.667-68): the “true” name for an object will 
be determined by the victor in the war. But this link between relations of force and relations of 
truth structures the poem’s universe in a more fundamental way.  
 Foucault writes that, in the discourse of permanent war, truth is always polemically en-
gaged. “The identification of truth with peace or neutrality… is being dissolved,” and instead 
truth “can be deployed only from its combat position.”37 “It is a discourse in which truth func-
tions exclusively as a weapon that is used to win an exclusively partisan victory.”38 We see exactly 
this in the De Bello Ciuili, again in contexts where Lucan is strategically rewriting and inverting 
the Aeneid’s historico-political discourse. For example, where Virgil invokes the Muse as the 
source of the information he will convey in the Aeneid (“Muse, inscribe in my memory the caus-
es”, 1.8), Lucan appeals to Nero, the sovereign, as the source of all truth, saying “You alone are 
sufficient to give strength [uires] to a Roman bard.”39 Lucan’s work is, then, specifically Roman in 
a way that Virgil’s is not, and derives its strength and power from the Roman sovereign, not from 
the divine and all-knowing Muse. Lucan, in other words, speaks from a politically and polemical-
ly committed position, not from a neutral and divinely-guaranteed one. Further, the word Lucan 
uses for “strength” here, uires (perhaps best translated as “force” and with a strong connotation of 
violence), has already appeared in the poem in the sense of “military force” (at 1.4). Lucan’s epic, 
then, far from being “true” because it is dictated by a Muse, is “Roman” because it is backed by 
                                                                                                                                                                       
and the oxymoron is lost: “The whole contraption of the world ripped apart/ shall riot, confounding its treaties 
in discord.” Lucan, Civil War, translated by Matthew Fox (London: Penguin, 2012), 5. 
36 Foucault, Society, 52. 
37 Ibid., 52. 
38 Ibid., 52, 58. 
39 Lucan, DBC 1.66, trans. Duff 
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the physical and military force of the sovereign. The truth that Lucan tells is a Roman truth, po-
lemically deployed in order to win a victory in the field of historical knowledge.  
 Lucan’s epic thus opens up a battlefield in which all knowledge is polemically committed; 
we are all required to take sides in a battle of truth; and this knowledge or truth is above all his-
torical – the fourth key aspect of the discourse that Foucault analyses. Foucault writes:  
 
This discourse about the general war, this discourse that tries to interpret the war beneath 
peace, is indeed an attempt to describe the battle as a whole and to reconstruct the general 
course of the war. But that does not make it a totalizing or neutral discourse; it is always a per-
spectival discourse. It is interested in the totality only to the extent that it can see it in one-sided 
terms, distort it and see it from its own point of view.40 
 
Lucan, meanwhile, writes:  
 
Even in later ages and among posterity, these events… will excite hope and fear together and 
useless prayers, when the story of battle is read; and all men will be spell-bound as they read 
the tragedy, as if it were still to come and not past; and all will still take sides with Magnus 
[Pompey].41  
 
His account of the war is explicitly perspectival, polemical, and one-sided: the poem, he tells us, is 
designed not to convey a neutral and universal truth about the past, but to stir up passionate 
commitment to one side in a conflict which we experience as still on-going (“as if [the outcome] 
were still to come and not past”). Historical knowledge, for Lucan as for Foucault, becomes the 
privileged site of political struggle, commitment, and resistance; indeed, Lucan’s writing of his-
torical epic and his “extra-textual” political commitment are inextricably intertwined. Lucan 
committed suicide at the age of twenty-five after he was found to have taken part in a conspiracy 
to assassinate Nero: he opened his veins in a warm bath and died reciting the words of one of the 
characters in his own poem.42  
The De Bello Ciuili, then, articulates a discourse of exactly the type Foucault identifies as an 
anti-Roman discourse of permanent war. Moreover, it explicitly articulates this discourse as anti-
Roman (or at least, in John Henderson’s terms, as “always already the war within the Imperial 
Muse”).43 The dominant reading of Lucan’s epic in the twentieth century – one to which I whole-
heartedly subscribe – is as an “anti-Aeneid.”44 As we have glimpsed above, and as has been shown 
                                                 
40 Foucault, Society, 52. 
41 Lucan, DBC, 7.207-213. 
42 For a brilliant reading of the entangled discursive relationship between the De Bello Ciuili and its author’s 
death, see Henderson, “Lucan,” 125. 
43 Ibid., 123.  
44 See, for example, Ahl, Lucan, 64-67, and Gian Biagio Conte, Latin Literature: A History, translated by Joseph 
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in detail by other critics, the De Bello Ciuili makes its historico-political points in large part 
through its appropriation and rewriting of Virgil’s epic. Henderson, for example, writes: 
 
His epic… implodes [Rome’s] traditions and ideologies along with the documents which bear 
them… Lucan’s text does trace a subversion of the system of values, linguistic, literary, ideolog-
ical and cultural, which are fixed in place, asserted and paraded by the epic tradition, the paideia 
which is monumentalised and ‘statufied’ in the massive, totalising articulation through twelve 
irrevocable books of all… that can be implied in… Virgil’s arma uirumque cano.45 
 
The De Bello Ciuili is, then, a thoroughgoing and polemically engaged deconstruction of the his-
torical and political principles which structure Virgil’s epic – notably the unity and continuity of 
Roman power – and a savage denunciation of the violence, permanent war, and play of domina-
tion and repression, which Lucan reveals as only ever disguised by the institutions of peaceful 
civil society. In other words, it is “the shattering of a pre-existing historical discourse whose func-
tion had until then been to sing the praises of Rome”46 – and it takes place in 65 CE. 
 
Nietzsche, genealogy, history; Lucan, reception, counter-history? 
Two questions are raised here. Firstly, what does it mean to say that a discourse whose “date of 
birth” Foucault traces to the late sixteenth century can be detected in an epic poem from the first 
century? What kind of historical claim can we make about the relationship between the discourse 
of permanent war in Lucan’s poem and the discourse of permanent war that emerges in the six-
teenth century? And secondly, how can it be that Lucan and Boulainvilliers have the same enemy, 
counter the same history?  
One approach to the first question would be to argue that the discourse of permanent war 
originates, simply and entirely, with Lucan; that Lucan’s poem retains, in a certain way, owner-
ship of this discourse, which can then only be fully understood by referring back to the poem’s 
formal and conceptual machinery; and that the re-emergence of this discourse in a later historical 
period is brought about by the re-emergence of Lucan’s poem as a historical actor. A strong case 
can, in fact, be made for this. Foucault is clear and emphatic about the date of the emergence of a 
discourse of permanent war in England: it emerged in “very specific conditions between the end 
of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century.”47 Is it a coincidence that, in the words 
of Edward Paleit’s recent book on the reception of Lucan in England, “it is only a slight exaggera-
tion to term the period of English literature between the mid-1580s and the 1640s an ‘age of Lu-
                                                                                                                                                                       
niscent of Foucault, that Lucan uses “the facts of history” (Ahl, 66) or “fidelity to the historical truth” (Conte, 
444) in “the polemic against Vergil” (ibid.).  
45 Henderson, “Lucan,” 143. 
46 Foucault, Society, 141.  
47 Ibid., 58. 
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can’”?48 That is, at exactly the moment where Foucault places the birth of the discourse of perma-
nent war, “there seems to have been a significant increase in the number and intensity of en-
gagements with Lucan’s text across many different forms of discourse”?49 For, as Paleit goes on to 
point out, it is not only in literature that Lucan’s influence can be seen in the England of this peri-
od: imitations of and allusions to Lucan abound across historical poetry, drama, and “works of 
moral and political theory;” moreover, excerpts from De Bello Ciuili “achieved independent circu-
lation in contemporary culture” in this period, appearing in a range of contexts from “arguments 
about the morality of courtly politics” to “debates over the soteriology of Christian burial.”50 
Such an argument, however, is immediately susceptible to the critique that Foucault aims, 
in The Archaeology of Knowledge, at “the notion of influence,” which provides a support – of too 
magical a kind to be very amenable to analysis – for the facts of transmission and communication; 
which refers to an apparently causal process (but with neither rigorous delimitation nor theoreti-
cal definition) the phenomena of resemblance or repetition; which links, at a distance and through 
time – as if through the mediation of a medium of propagation – such defined unities as individ-
uals, oeuvres, notions, or theories.51 
 
If not through the notion of “influence” – which, as Foucault points out, has to posit the existence 
of some sort of magical ether (a “medium of propagation”) through which Lucan’s “notions” are 
transmitted intact through time and space to England in the 1580s – how, then, are we to under-
stand the “phenomena of resemblance and repetition” with which we are dealing here?  
 The question – what does it mean that one period or work resembles or repeats an earlier 
one – is clearly an important one for Foucault, and goes to the heart of his method: his genealogi-
cal project and his critique of monumental or “metaphysical” history. It is also an important ques-
tion for a reception scholar, because it asks us to examine our frameworks for understanding the 
historicity and the transtemporal agency of literary texts.  
 So far in this paper I have singled out the way that Foucault emphasizes the newness and 
strangeness of the discourse of permanent war and its status as a break from existing historical 
forms and norms. However, although he is interested in isolating the disruptive force of the dis-
course’s emergence, on several occasions a revealing hesitation is visible in Foucault’s language 
over whether this discourse might, in fact, be an example of resemblance and repetition rather 
than a pure emergence. For instance, he writes, in a passage I have partially cited above, that the 
discourse of permanent war “began its career – or perhaps its new career in the West – in very specif-
                                                 
48 Edward Paleit, War, Liberty and Caesar: Responses to Lucan’s Bellum Ciuile, ca. 1580-1650 (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2013), 10-11. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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ic conditions between the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century” (em-
phasis added).52 
 On a few scattered occasions in the lectures, a theory of history as the “reactivation” of the 
past becomes visible. For example, Foucault argues that “the juridico-political theory of sover-
eignty… dates from the Middle Ages. It dates from the reactivation of Roman law,”53 and that 
“royal power developed throughout the Middle Ages by modelling itself on the Roman imperi-
um and reactivating the Imperial rights that were codified in the era of Justinian.”54 Foucault also 
argues that the “disruption of the praise of Rome” – or, in even stronger terms, “the shattering of 
a pre-existing historical discourse” – “in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries came 
about in two ways”: the first is “the reactivation of the fact of the invasion,” which “introduced a 
major break in time.”55 
Thus we have an image of a historical event, datable to a particular period (the late seven-
teenth and early eighteenth centuries), which functions to disrupt or shatter an existing discourse. 
And we also have the claim that this event consists (at least in part) in a “reactivation” of a histor-
ical fact, or – in the medieval examples – of an earlier system of right or law. “Reactivation” itself 
becomes a highly important form of historical/political action. The term suggests that facts, ideas, 
or theories somehow lie dormant for long periods of time until historical agents “reactivate” them 
in the present. 
This is where Foucault’s method begins to coalesce with the methods and theories of re-
ception studies.56 An often-quoted axiom of classical reception is that “meaning is realized at the 
point of reception.”57 That is, a text does not have a meaning which is successively configured in 
time; rather, readers, as active interpretative agents embedded in specific discursive and historical 
contexts, activate particular conceptual, affective, or political formations which exist neither pure-
ly “in” the text nor “in” the reader, but emerge out of the complex interface between text, reader, 
and context.58 Interpretation thus becomes a highly politicized act, and the “reactivation” of his-
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torical texts and discourses is a key aspect of political struggle against domination – or, indeed, for 
domination – in the present day.  
In this light, Foucault’s theory of genealogy can be taken as, ultimately, a theory of recep-
tion, or a theory of history-as-reception. He begins his important essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History” with a critique of Paul Ree for “assum[ing] that words had kept their meaning… and 
that ideas retained their logic; … he ignored the fact that the world of speech and desires has 
known invasions, struggles, plundering, disguises, ploys.”59 Throughout the essay he distin-
guishes metaphysics from genealogy by arguing that the metaphysician “plac[es] present needs at 
the origin” in order to “convince us of an obscure purpose that seeks its realization at the moment 
it arises,”60 while “genealogy does not pretend to go back in time… to demonstrate that the past 
actively exists in the present, that it continues secretly to animate the present, having imposed a 
predetermined form on all its vicissitudes.”61 Similarly, reception – which distinguishes itself vig-
orously from “source study” and from untheorized models of “influence” like those critiqued in 
The Archaeology of Knowledge – does not assume that words keep their meanings, that meaning is 
not the site of struggle, or that a historical text imposes a predetermined form on all the vicissi-
tudes of interpretation. Instead, as Foucault puts it later in the “Nietzsche” essay:  
 
The isolation of different points of emergence does not conform to the successive configurations 
of an identical meaning; rather, they result from substitutions, displacements, disguised con-
quests, and systematic reversals. If interpretation were the slow exposure of the meaning hid-
den in an origin, then only metaphysics could interpret the development of humanity. But if in-
terpretation is the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has 
no essential meaning, in order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its partici-
pation in a different game, and to subject it to secondary rules, then the development of human-
ity is a series of interpretations. The role of genealogy is to record its history: the history of mor-
als, ideals, and metaphysical concepts, the history of the concept of liberty or of the ascetic life; 
as they stand for the emergence of different interpretations, they must be made to appear as 
events on the stage of historical process.62  
 
Reception knows this well: there is no single, original meaning in a text which is slowly exposed, 
or successively configured. There is a war of interpretations, and history and counter-history can-
not stand outside that war.  
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What’s striking here is how similar Foucault’s image of history as a war of interpretation is 
to the discourse he finds in the seventeenth century (and I find in Lucan): a discourse in which 
history is the field of political struggle and truth can only be deployed from a combat position; in 
which interpretation, as the violent struggle over the rules for the production of “truth,” is the 
political act par excellence. What is happening in the 1975-6 lectures, then, is not so much the dis-
covery of the “truth” of a historical moment of emergence; rather, it is the polemical reactivation 
of a past discourse in and against the present. This is history as counter-history; Foucault is reac-
tivating a past discourse just as, in his account, Boulainvilliers “reactivates the fact of the inva-
sion.”  
In Foucault’s account, however, “Rome” itself seems to function as an oddly ahistorical en-
tity. In deploying Rome as a figure for the unbroken continuity of power, Foucault seems to sug-
gest that the discourse of Roman history does not, itself, need to be reactivated. As I argued 
above, Rome, for Foucault, functions not as a historical entity, but the background against which 
history happens. “Rome” is somehow there to counter for the English writers of the late sixteenth 
centuries and the French writers of the early eighteenth, just as it was for Lucan. But in what way 
can a historical discourse developed in the early seventeenth century be a counter-history to Ro-
man history? How and why has Rome retained power over history and truth continuously, in an 
unbroken genealogy, from the birth of its Empire to a millennium and more after its fall, into the 
seventeenth century and even into the late twentieth? In The Archaeology of Knowledge, as Alston 
points out in the introductory chapter “Foucault’s Rome” in this volume, Foucault writes that 
“discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but treated as and when it 
occurs.”63 Why does this not apply to Rome? 
Foucault deploys “Rome” here to name the kind of history that is countered by the dis-
course of permanent war, with the consequence that, in his own writing, “Rome” escapes its po-
litical and historical boundaries in time and space to become the adversary in a permanent, un-
ending – and unendable – war, fought in the limitless historico-political (battle)field. Thus, when 
Foucault uses the name “Roman history” for the history that is being countered by the seven-
teenth-century discourse of permanent war, he is not only taking a side in the historico-political 
war, but also invoking a discourse which makes Roman Imperial power coterminous with the 
production of historical knowledge. In so doing, as suggested, he departs radically from his usual 
historical practice, summarized by Alston as “establish[ing] historical divergences in which epis-
temological links break down or arise” and “uncover[ing] a multiplicity of loosely linked systems 
and power dynamics that undermine any grand philosophical histories.”64 Rome, for Foucault at 
this period, is not a “multiplicity of loosely linked systems and power dynamics,” but a totality. 
Rather than attending to the “obscurity of contingencies and all the minor incidents that bring 
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about defeats and ensure victories,”65 Foucault constructs a Rome whose power is all but abso-
lute, and whose control over the historical field is total and unquestioned until the moment of 
“shattering” in the late sixteenth century. Rome itself escapes the play of history and becomes the 
eternal enemy in the permanent war. 
There is something exceptional about Rome – Rome and history, Rome in history, Roman 
history66 – not just for Foucault but in post-Roman European thought more generally. As I have 
argued elsewhere, this discursive construction of Rome as the eternal adversary, the place where 
power, knowledge, and history merge, is deeply embedded in post-Roman European thought.67 It 
surfaces in texts which might otherwise not appear to be connected, from Philip K Dick’s 1974 
novel Valis (which tells the story of a permanent war against “the Empire, the Black Iron Prison, 
as the super or trans-temporal constant”68) to Hardt and Negri’s Empire (2000), where they write 
that “the concept of Empire presents itself not as a historical regime originating in conquest, but 
rather as an order that effectively suspends history and thereby fixes the existing state of affairs 
for eternity.”69 
The “counter-history” that Foucault traces in the Society lectures thus ultimately depends 
on an extant and pervasive construction of Rome as a transtemporal constant; a regime which 
somehow escapes the historical play of conquest and domination, repression and reactivation. To 
justify his genealogical method and to give it the polemical force he wants it to have in the pre-
sent, Foucault needs there to be a backdrop of historical continuity against which discourses 
emerge in the discontinuous, contingent way which his methodology centres and valorizes. Call-
ing this backdrop “Rome” implicates him in a particularly persistent European historical fantasy 
dating back to the Augustan period – and makes him, to a certain extent, complicit with the ene-
my he has constructed because he succumbs to the fantasy that Rome has indeed succeeded in 
creating and sustaining a continuous, unified, transhistorical field of power which escapes the 
violent contingencies and vicissitudes of history. In “studiously avoid[ing] the Classical”70 – in 
refusing to turn his critical/ genealogical attention to Rome – Foucault has, paradoxically, ceded 
power to Rome. Or at least, he has left it to us to continue his project: as this paper has shown, 
Foucault in fact provides a powerful framework for a reading of Lucan which enables us to open 
up “Roman history” to a genealogical gaze and see that, far from being only “a ritual that rein-
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forced sovereignty,”71 Rome is like all other discursive formations: fissured and messy, riven by 
local and partial resistances, uneven and dispersed throughout history, susceptible to periods of 
latency and periods of reactivation. Rome, then, speaks back to Foucault – and Foucault, despite 
himself, can show us how to speak back to Rome. 
 
 
Ika Willis 
University of Wollongong  
Northfields Ave  
Wollongong NSW 2522  
Australia 
ikaw@uow.edu.au 
                                                 
71 Foucault, Society, 69. 
